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The 1998 Belfast Agreement brought to an end over three decades of armed 
conflict in Northern Ireland. This paper summarises the role of actors within and 
outside Northern Ireland, together with the processes and mechanics of the 
Agreement itself. The Agreement is placed in the context of previous 
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unsuccessful peace initiatives in the region, and elements within the political and 
economic environment at the time that facilitated agreement are identified. The 
consociational nature of the Agreement is set alongside concern about 
continuing sectarian division.  It is argued that the Agreement was as much a 
product of previous failed attempts and the changed economic and political 
environment as it was a product of the negotiations. The Belfast Agreement is 
evaluated and tentative lessons for the Arab-Israeli and other peace processes 
are delineated.  
 
 
Brief background to the 1998 Belfast Agreement  
Since the foundation of the Northern Ireland state by the passing of the 
Government of Ireland Act (1920), relationships between the Protestant Unionist 
two-thirds majority and the Catholic Nationalist minority were troubled. The Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) had succeeded in negotiating treaty with the British, 
following their insurrection in 1916, which effectively ended British rule in the 
southern 26 counties of Ireland.  Residual Nationalist ambitions for a united 
Ireland led Northern Unionists - adamant about maintaining the link with Britain - 
to regard the Nationalist minority in the north with suspicion. Nationalists were 
barely represented in the police or other organs of the state, and the size of the 
Unionist majority ensured they were permanently excluded from political power.  
 
By 1969, inspired by a world-wide movement for civil rights, Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, and a small number of radical Protestants demanded change. The 
Northern Ireland state resisted reform and met the civil rights movement with 
violence, leading ultimately to the proroguing of the Stormont parliament, and 
direct rule from Westminster.  Civil disorder led to the deployment of British 
troops, initially welcomed by the Catholic community, who saw them in the role of 
protector. However, the IRA reorganized and began a military campaign against 
the British troops and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Thus began a three-
cornered ‘war’ – between Republican paramilitaries, mainly the IRA and the 
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British Army and RUC on the one hand and between the Loyalist and Republican 
paramilitaries on the other. Over 3,700
2
 people lost their lives as a result, the 
majority civilians, with Republican paramilitaries responsible for 56 per cent of all 
deaths, Loyalists for about a third and security forces responsible for about a 
tenth
3
. Deaths peaked in the 1970s, due to a bombing campaign by the IRA, but 
subsequently reduced to what Home Secretary at the time for Northern Ireland, 
Reginald Maudling referred to as ‘an acceptable level’, although lives continued 
to be lost and the society was comprehensively militarised
4
. The conflict 
continued with only brief respites until the cessations of 1994.  
 
In the 1990s it emerged that the British government had maintained secret 
contact with the IRA from the early 1970s. Similarly, it emerged that the 
constitutional nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
had been talking secretly to Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, and in 1993 
the initiation of the current peace process led to the Loyalist and Republican 
cease-fires of August 1994
5
. These broke down, due to a lack of progress, partly 
due to the British Conservative government’s dependence on Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) votes in Westminster for their government’s survival. After the 
British Labour victory, the peace process acquired new life, although the 
traditional stand of the Unionists - not to engage in talks with Sinn Féin because 
of their link to the IRA - still caused difficulty. Eventually the Ulster Unionists 
agreed to participate in order to ‘confront Sinn Fein’. The United States (US) 
government supported the process by providing a chairperson, Senator George 
Mitchell, to chair negotiations. These talks ultimately led to the signing of the 
Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which was overwhelmingly supported in a 
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referendum in the Republic of Ireland. In Northern Ireland, it was overwhelmingly 
supported by Nationalists/ Catholics, but only a slim majority of 
Unionists/Protestants supported it, due inter alia to divisions within unionism 
about the involvement of Sinn Féin in the process
6
.  Ian Paisley’s Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) did not participate in talks and opposed the Agreement. 
 
Following elections, the Northern Ireland Assembly was eventually established in 
November 1999, and power for all but security and taxation was devolved from 
Westminster. The Assembly was headed by the Office of the First and Deputy 
First Minister (OFMDFM), the first to hold the office of first Minister was David 
Trimble of the UUP. The Deputy First Minister was drawn from the Nationalist 
side, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party’s (SDLP) Seamus Mallon was 
the first to hold that post. However, the British government suspended the 
Assembly in February 2000 because of a lack of progress on the 
decommissioning of IRA weapons. By May, the Assembly was reinstated, 
following the IRA’s engagement with the decommissioning body but was again 
suspended the Assembly in August 2001, following the resignation of David 
Trimble, only to be briefly reinstated again before suspension in 2002.  
 
The process remained deadlocked over the issue of decommissioning of 
weapons and the reliability of the IRA ceasefire. The Assembly was not to meet 
again until May 2006, and was not reinstated until after further negotiations at St 
Andrew’s in Scotland, which this time included the DUP, who had opposed the 
Agreement and was by then the largest Unionist Party.  Elections to the 
Assembly in March 2007 led to the reinstatement of the Assembly in May 2007, 
with the DUP’s Ian Paisley as First Minister, and Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness 
as Deputy First Minister, in spite of Paisley’s adamant protestations that he 
would never sit in government with Sinn Féin.  
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Previous peace initiatives  
From early in the conflict, repeatedly unsuccessful attempts were made to broker 
peace. Indeed, Darby and McGinty (2000) point to seven failed attempts 
between 1972 and 1993
7
, the main features of which are presented briefly here 
in tabular form
8
. 
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Figure 1: Attempts at Agreement in Northern Ireland 
ATTEMPT AUTHORS/ 
NEGOTIATORS 
DATES DEAL OBSTACLES RESPONSE OUTCOME 
Sunningdale 
Agreement  
Negotiated by 
British and Irish 
governments 
Signed Dec. 
1973 
Power-sharing  
Elected NI cross 
community 
Assembly 
Cross- border 
Council of Ireland 
 
Unionist 
opposition to 
power-sharing 
and 
involvement of 
Irish 
government 
Unionists 
formed United 
Ulster Army 
Council and 
called a 2 
week national 
general strike 
Chief Executive 
of Assembly 
Brian Faulkner, 
UUP, resigned, 
Assembly 
collapsed 
Constitutional 
Convention 
78 locally 
elected 
representatives, 
of whom 47 
were UUUC, 
British 
government 
1975-1976 Elected 
representatives 
proposed: return 
to majority rule; 
no Council of 
Ireland; new NI 
parliament with 
greater powers; 
double NI seats 
at Westminster; 
oath of allegiance 
to the Queen for 
all public offices 
Rejected by 
constitutional 
nationalist 
SDLP and the 
Alliance Party 
British 
reconvened 
Convention 
for one month 
but no 
progress 
made 
British dissolved 
Convention 
March 1976. 
Northern 
Ireland 
Assembly 
British Secretary 
of State’s 
proposal for 
‘rolling 
devolution’  
October 
1982 – June 
1986 
Weighted 
majority to 
prevent Unionist 
veto; cross 
community 
support required 
for major 
SDLP and 
Irish 
government 
saw it as 
‘unworkable’. 
Sinn Féin 
contested 
Assembly 
contained 
only Unionists 
so was 
unworkable 
Dissolved June 
1986 in protest at 
the Anglo Irish 
Agreement. 
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Figure 1: Attempts at Agreement in Northern Ireland 
ATTEMPT AUTHORS/ 
NEGOTIATORS 
DATES DEAL OBSTACLES RESPONSE OUTCOME 
decisions election for 
first time, but 
boycotted 
Assembly with 
SDLP 
Anglo-Irish 
Agreement 
(AIA) 
British and Irish 
governments 
Signed 
November 
1985 
Designed to 
undermine Sinn 
Féin’s electoral 
success. 
Framework of 
relationships 
between British 
and Irish 
governments, 
role for Irish in NI 
affairs, Starnd 1: 
internal relations 
in NI; Strand 2: 
Relations 
between NI and 
the Republic of 
Ireland; Strand 3: 
relations between 
Republic of 
Ireland and 
British;   
Campaign of 
opposition by 
Unionists to 
involvement of 
Irish 
government. 
Irish unwilling 
to negotiate 
their territorial 
claim to NI 
(Articles 2 & 3 
of Irish 
Constitution). 
Supported 
outside NI, 
SDLP 
supported, but 
vehemently 
opposed by 
Unionists; 
DUP refused 
to attend talks 
in Dublin  
 
Established 
British Irish 
secretariat and 
channels of 
communication.  
 
Deadlock on 
further 
implementation.  
Brooke- Northern Ireland 1989-1993 Roundtable talks Agreement not 1993, John British Downing 
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Figure 1: Attempts at Agreement in Northern Ireland 
ATTEMPT AUTHORS/ 
NEGOTIATORS 
DATES DEAL OBSTACLES RESPONSE OUTCOME 
Mayhew Talks  political parties, 
excluding Sinn 
Féin 
based on Strands 
1-3 of AIA 
reached, but 
framework 
(Strands 1-3) 
agreed as 
useful 
Hume SDLP 
revealed their 
political talks 
aimed at 
peaceful 
resolution  
Street 
Declaration 
accepted 
principle of self-
determination for 
the future of NI, 
based on North-
South 
consensus. Irish 
constitution 
amended to 
remove territorial 
claim to NI. IRA 
ceasefire 1994 
Good Friday/ 
Belfast 
Agreement 
9
 
Elected 
negotiators 
included all 
constitutional 
nationalist and 
unionist parties 
and parties 
representing 
loyalist and 
republican 
armed groups; 
Irish 
Signed 1998 NI Assembly with 
cross community 
support required 
for certain 
decisions; 
powersharing 
(Strand 1); role 
for Irish 
government 
(Strand 2), British 
Irish 
intergovernmenta
DUP 
opposition and 
refusal to 
participate in 
talks; Sinn 
Féin’s refusal 
to endorse 
police; armed 
groups’ 
reluctance to 
decommission 
weapons 
Agreement 
ratified by 
plebiscite in 
NI (71% in NI 
- but only 56% 
of NI unionists 
voted in 
favour - and 
94% voted in 
favour in the 
Republic of 
Ireland) 
Agreement 
reached an NI 
Assembly 
established, but 
suspended in 
2002 over 
deadlock on 
several issues, 
police reform and 
support for the 
police, 
decommissioning 
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Figure 1: Attempts at Agreement in Northern Ireland 
ATTEMPT AUTHORS/ 
NEGOTIATORS 
DATES DEAL OBSTACLES RESPONSE OUTCOME 
government; 
British 
government; 
independent 
chair provided 
by USA 
l conference 
(Strand 3) 
Provision for 
human rights, 
police and 
criminal justice 
reform; 
decommissioning 
body to oversee 
disposal of 
paramilitary 
weapons; 
demilitarisation 
by British; 
financial 
incentives 
of weapons etc, 
and increasing 
support for 
radical parties 
(DUP and Sinn 
Féin) making 
agreement more 
difficult. 
St Andrew’s 
Agreement  
All those 
involved in the 
Good Friday 
Agreement 
October 
2006 
DUP support for 
powersharing in 
return for Sinn 
Féin 
endorsement of 
the police and 
participation in 
policing.  
Sinn Féin’s 
reluctance to 
sign up for 
policing, 
DUP’s 
reluctance to 
share power  
Agreement, 
powersharing 
established  
NI Assembly 
established.  
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Political and economic environment pertaining at the time 
Halliday (2006) points to a new interest on the part of the major world powers in 
the period after the Cold War to resolve and where feasible to prevent violent 
conflict, marking a departure from a previous global status quo, where local 
conflicts were incorporated into Cold War strategic rivalry (Halliday, 2006, p 396-
7).  However, the Northern Irish conflict largely stood outside the dynamics of the 
Cold War. The international influences on it, Cox (2006) argues, were of a 
different order: shifts in international attitudes to national liberation as a 
legitimate political goal; alterations in relationships between the United States 
and the British governments; and the influence of the European Union.  
The change in the relationship between the United States and the UK 
government inter alia after the attack on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon in September, 2001 was perhaps the most dramatic, if not the most 
significant of these. Whereas previously, the United States’ attitude to the conflict 
in Northern Ireland was regarded as favouring Republicans, by for example, 
tolerating Republican fund-raising in the US, the declaration of the ‘global war on 
terror’ marked a new consolidation of a US global dispensation towards groups 
regarded as ‘terrorist’. This new global revulsion at the carnage caused by 
terrorism gave Republicans, for whom the US connection was central, pause for 
thought as to how they might maintain friendly relationships with the US given 
their reluctance to decommission their weapons. This, combined with pressure 
exerted locally, meant that on October 23, 2001, the IRA issued a statement 
confirming that it had begun the process of decommissioning, with two other acts 
of decommissioning on 8 April 2002 and 21 October 2003 and on Thursday 28 
July 2005 the IRA formally ordered an end to its armed campaign and instructed 
all its active service units to dump arms. By 26 September 2005 the IICD, 
established to verify the decommissioning of weapons, stated that they were 
satisfied that the IRA had completed the decommissioning of all of its weaponry.  
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The continued interest of the Clinton administration in the Irish peace process 
from the early 1990s onward helped sustain British stamina for the protracted 
process of reaching agreement. The Irish diaspora within the US, in turn, 
provided motivation for continued American involvement.  
 
Local civil society organizations also played a role in setting out the issues. Local 
human rights NGOs
10
 highlighted shortcomings in the justice and policing 
systems, making use of international human rights networks and taking some of 
these concerns as far as the European court and the UN, thus placing them 
firmly on the political agenda. Since the early 1970s, within highly segregated 
local areas, especially on the Catholic side, communities were well organized 
and deeply engaged in local community development work
11
. Especially from the 
1990s onward, some of this community work was directed at improving 
relationships across the sectarian divide, and at managing and containing 
violence
12
. Local groups established mechanisms such as a mobile phone 
network along the interfaces of Belfast, and later elsewhere, as a way of pre-
empting sectarian violence in communities
13
.  
 
The influence of the European Union (EU) was also significant in a number of 
ways. First, the exposure of local politicians such as Paisley and Hume to politics 
at a European level diminished parochialism and added a dimension, especially 
to Hume’s political repertoire, and which he used to good avail. Second, the 
success of the economy in the Republic of Ireland following European 
membership raised questions about how the north of the island might benefit 
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from the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy which was the fastest growing 
economy in Europe.  
Europe’s direct intervention in economic development benefited both north and 
south. However, whilst the Irish government managed its own affairs with 
increasing success, the north’s EU assistance was delivered through the UK 
government, giving rise to questions amongst some Unionists about whether the 
UK acted entirely in the interests of Northern Ireland. Whilst the economy in 
Northern Ireland slowly improved, it could not match the rapid growth of its 
neighbour South of the border
14
.  
It is perhaps the EU’s role in peace-building in Northern Ireland, through its 
Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation that is most 
significant. Following the ceasefires of 1994 the EU approved a Special Support 
Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border 
Counties of Ireland
15
. This programme, worth 691 million Euros in the first phase 
aimed at underpinning peace building activities by promoting social and 
economic inclusion. From its commencement in 1995, it concentrated on issues 
related to the healing of sectarian divisions. More than half of the funds were 
distributed through civil society organizations, some of whom were specifically 
set up for that purpose. Twenty six District Partnerships were established, 
overseen by a 22-member Northern Ireland Partnership Board made up of 
political parties, trade unions, business and rural communities, and voluntary 
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organisations. Balance in terms of religion, gender and political affiliation, and 
cooperation between the various factions was a requirement for the funds to be 
delivered and managed, thus creating relationships across the political divide. 
Grassroots projects supported by the funding also worked with victims of the 
conflict and ex-prisoners, enhanced business and cultural links between 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and offered retraining to individuals 
previously employed in the security sector.  
 
Successes and failures of Belfast Agreement  
Ten years after the Belfast Agreement, levels of political violence in Northern 
Ireland are negligible, unemployment has fallen by 7 per cent, house prices have 
risen by 400 per cent, and the new Assembly, headed by First Minister Paisley 
and Deputy First Minister McGuinness is widely celebrated as a success story. 
This may seem like a ‘happy ending’ to the sorry tale of death and destruction 
that came before. Certainly, the reduction in violence, IRA decommissioning, and 
more or less credible and enduring ceasefires on the part of the main 
protagonists is a major step forward. The reform of the police and criminal justice 
system, new provisions for human rights and equality and mechanisms for 
improved accountability and governance has created a sense that there are new 
institutions for a new dispensation. Politicians have been attracted back into the 
job of government, with the seemingly miraculous volte face  by Dr Paisley and 
the DUP going  into government with Sinn Féin, and Paisley’s subsequent 
canonisation by the media as a man of peace, after all.  
 
Nonetheless, the Agreement has its successes and failures. Although initially 
supported by a slim majority of Unionists at the time of the referendum, Unionist 
support for the Agreement waned thereafter.  Following the Agreement, the 
electoral collapse of middle ground Unionism, accompanied by a similar collapse 
of the SDLP on the nationalist side, left the most radical elements on both sides 
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as the biggest parties. The challenge of bringing the anti-Agreement DUP into 
government with its historic enemy, Sinn Féin seemed overwhelming. It was not 
until further negotiations at St Andrew’s in Scotland in 2006 that the DUP was 
successfully engaged and Paisley’s entry into government with Sinn Féin has 
caused further dismay amongst radical Unionist, some of whom regard him as a 
traitor for this move.  
 
Other violent divisions within Loyalism following the 1998 Agreement gave rise to 
other concerns. Loyalist paramilitaries did not substantially engage in the 
decommissioning process, and violent feuding took place in Belfast’s Shankill 
Road Gallaher and Shirlow (2006) describe the substantive issues involved in 
the feuding as between: 
  
…those who wish to transform Loyalists out of conflict and criminality, and 
those who wish to perpetuate criminal greed and sectarian and racist 
actions…. a divide between those who wish to reposition Loyalism and 
those who have been unable to shift into a non-violent non-criminal mode. 
(Gallaher and Shirlow, 2006, p 150)  
 
The UVF and its political wing the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) have 
negotiated the transformation more successfully, winning a seat in the Assembly, 
held initially by the late David Ervine, now by Dawn Purvis. The UDA were less 
successful, their political party the Ulster Democratic Party was disbanded and 
controversially, in 2007, the government gave them a grant of £1.2m to assist 
with their transformation into a non-violent organisation. Following the 
announcement of the funding, the police alleged that they were still involved in 
criminal activity
16
. The Minister for Social Development threatened to withdraw 
the money unless they began to decommission their weapons
17
. However, the 
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Ulster Political Research Group, the nom de paix of the UDA, instituted legal 
action which effectively prevented this. 
 
Loyalist and Unionist disaffection with the new political dispensation remains a 
concern
18
. Part of this disaffection is to do with the new dispensation itself, the 
establishment of a Human Rights Commission, the reform of the police and 
justice system, the introduction of a Bill of Rights, all of which is seen to be 
capitulation to Nationalist demands.  The equality and anti-discrimination agenda 
is perceived by many Unionists to have reversed the fortunes of the two 
communities, to the extent that Protestants are now discriminated against. Most 
seriously, although the protection of rights was a central part of the Agreement, 
and arguably essential in a divided society in order to protect against 
discrimination, the human rights and equality agenda has been construed as 
antithetical to reconciliation, crystallising the competition between the two 
communities.  
 
The continued operations of groups such as the UDA and the dissident 
Republican groups, the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA have implications for 
the policing of communities. However, with the participation of Sinn Féin in local 
policing committees, and as the reform of police recruitment begins to increase 
Catholic representation in the police, these issues are largely perceived as 
criminal matters, rather than affecting the stability of the political settlement. This 
is in the context of a reduction in recorded crime of 10.5% for 2007/8
19
.  
 
Similarly, the arrangements within the Assembly for designation of identity of 
members and for cross community voting are increasingly seen by some as the 
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institutionalisation of sectarian division. Indeed, Tonge and Evans (2002), who 
conducted a survey of the intermediate tier of political party members, and found 
that in contemporary debates, the requirement for parallel consent across bloc 
designations in the Assembly may not be necessary, and could operate as an 
obstacle to achieving change in matters of educational policy. Tonge and Evans 
(2002) found divisions within the political parties rather than between parties on 
issues not related to sectarian conflict.  
 
This is compounded by the unassailable power positions of the DUP and Sinn 
Féin in their respective constituencies, whereby they can ‘do deals’ with each 
other to which there can be no effective opposition. This had led to the 
accusation that many decisions are made on the basis of a sectarian carve-up 
between the two main parties, rather than on the merits of the issue at hand.  
 
Ten years after the Agreement, there is a lack of progress on issues of 
segregation, sectarian violence and the deep divisions between the two 
communities. A report by Hughes, Donnelly, Robinson and Dowds  in 2000 
found that sectarian divisions had gotten worse, yet the Northern Ireland Life and 
Times survey in 2007 found that 65% of respondents thought that relationships 
between Catholics and Protestants were better than before, and 30% thought 
they were about the same, although most respondents thought that sectarian 
violence was still a problem in Northern Ireland. Since there appears to be little 
will on the part of the main parties to address these divisions, the settlement will 
remain vulnerable to collapse should sectarian divisions again manifest 
themselves in more widespread violence.  
 
Lessons for other peace processes  
The cautions about the ‘success’ of the Agreement notwithstanding, certain 
features of the Agreement and the long process that led up it may help shed light 
on similar processes elsewhere.  
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1. Duration of the process 
The first lesson from the Irish experience, in common with the Arab Israeli 
experience, is the duration of the process. Whilst some may see the Agreement 
as Blair’s legacy, or the Assembly as Paisley’s last grand geste, it is clear from 
an examination of the history of the process that the underpinnings of agreement 
and the establishment of the Assembly were laid down early in the conflict.  
Previous successive ‘failed’ attempts at agreement and devolved government 
were crucial in identifying a set of issues and possible solutions, which, over 
time, focused the sense of intractability onto two or three key issues, and helped 
identify the key actors.  
 
Any attempt, whether successful or not, at achieving peace has the potential in 
the short-term to create a new imagined hopeful future in the context of a violent 
present, and in the long run to contribute to a successful outcome, which is 
cumulatively achieved over decades. Negotiations take place in, and are shaped 
by, histories of previous encounters and previous attempts, which have 
constructed the agenda, created the dynamics and located the antagonisms.    
The antecedents of negotiations must be taken account of: indeed, some have 
described the Belfast Agreement as ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’. Where the 
level of intractability is high, it is likely that progress is likely to be slow, 
punctuated by apparent failure, and cumulative over long periods of time.  
 
2. ‘Talking to terrorists’ 
What distinguishes the Belfast Agreement and the processes leading up to it 
from previous such attempts is the participation of the armed organisations in 
negotiations
20
. This inclusivity distinguishes the Belfast Agreement from its 
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predecessors, according to Tonge (2000). Without ‘talking to terrorists’, there 
would have been no cessations, and subsequently no agreement. The idea of 
‘talking to terrorists’ is often unpalatable to governments, since to negotiate with 
those who wield terror is to imply that they have legitimate grievances and 
demands. Nonetheless, the British government held secret negotiations with the 
IRA sporadically, almost from the beginning of the conflict, whilst simultaneously 
denying that such negotiations were taking place. The existence of such back-
channels provided a communication infrastructure which supported the ultimate 
establishment of multi-party talks including the armed groups and ultimately led 
to the agreement.   
 
The inclusion of representatives of the armed groups in negotiations affords the 
opportunity to deal directly with the issue of violence and responsibility for it. 
Schulze (2001) argues for the inclusion of militants based on both the Northern 
Ireland and Lebanese examples, a position supported by other analysts such as 
Mc Garry and O’Leary, but opposed by Horowitz (2001), who sees the inclusion 
of militants, especially Sinn Féin, as destabilising. The effectiveness of 
cessations in the Northern Ireland case was monitored, and the use of the 
Mitchell Principles allowed for the temporary exclusion of those whose armed 
wings committed violent acts. Participation in negotiations became a ‘carrot’ for 
armed organisations and exclusion from talks became the ‘stick’.  Thus, the 
armed organisations represented in negotiations were less dangerous to the 
process and less likely to be spoilers than those smaller armed organisations 
who were not present.  
 
3. Consultation with constituencies 
During negotiations, some parties expressed frustration at delays in the process 
incurred, particularly by Sinn Féin who seemed to take an inordinate amount of 
time to respond to certain questions and proposals. However, Sinn Féin engaged 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 19 
in extensive consultation within its constituency, from grass roots level upwards, 
ensuring that the party had a robust mandate from its constituency. ‘Leading 
from the front’, without engaging in such extensive internal consultation, leaves 
leaders vulnerable to mutiny and splits within their own ranks. Subsequently, as 
the terms of the Agreement became clearer, support waned amongst unionists in 
particular. Frustrating as it might be during negotiations, parties need time and 
support to bring their constituents with them, and this ultimately is crucial to the 
success of any outcome. 
 
In the post Agreement period, the role of politicians and civil society in 
championing an agreement is critical, since a written agreement cannot be an 
end in itself.  Maintaining the confidence of the electorate post agreement, whilst 
democratic institutions are being established is a key political task, yet politicians, 
preoccupied with shaping such institutions, may neglect this task, as in the 
Northern Ireland case.  
 
4. Independence of government 
Under John Major’s premiership, the British government were dependent on 
Unionist votes at Westminster to maintain his balance of power. This stymied 
any initiative he might have wished to take in Northern Ireland that would evoke 
the displeasure of Unionists. In spite of this, Major managed to begin the 
process, and established the basis for negotiations. Labour’s landslide victory 
afforded Tony Blair the free hand that Major had lacked.  Blair was able to 
engage with Unionists on an independent basis, and this proved essential to 
achieving further progress. McGarry argues: 
 
Agreement was reached in 1998 on a consociational government and 
North South institutions in part because London made it clear to unionists 
that the default settlement was no longer unalloyed direct rule from 
Westminster, but instead, deepening Anglo-Irish cooperation in the 
governance of Northern Ireland. (McGarry, 2001, p 16)  
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McGarry goes on to point out that the IRA ceasefire and the rescinding of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, which claimed territorial rights over 
Northern Ireland, were important incentives for Unionist agreement. We will 
return to the issue of the consociational nature of the Agreement later. 
 
Throughout the negotiations, various incentives were offered to the local parties 
in order to increase their motivation for compromise and agreement. These  
included financial packages, various reforms, assurances and guarantees, 
constitutional amendments by the Irish state and political concessions of various 
kinds. Parties had to earn these incentives by signing up to various deals, 
abandoning previous positions and desisting from previous behaviours. 
Incentives were deployed alongside sanctions, such as exclusion from talks, or 
threats of undesirable consequences. The balancing of sanctions and incentives 
composed the choreography of the peace process itself. The role of the British 
government as a ‘second’ for Unionists and the Irish government as a ‘second’ 
for Nationalists added a moderating dimension to the application of incentives 
and sanctions. This built the confidence of both sides, in that they were not in the 
process alone, yet when their ‘second’ refused to champion them in the face of 
sanctions, the pressure on them to change intensified.  
 
5. Inclusion of civil society in addressing division 
Ten years after the Agreement, sectarian division in Northern Ireland is as deep 
as ever, with continuing sectarian violence between communities punctuating 
daily life. The Agreement, although negotiated by mandated representatives of 
the electorate, was nonetheless a product of an elite process, from which local 
communities were largely excluded. It is one of the failures of the Agreement, 
and the political institutions that followed, that these deep divisions and patterns 
of segregation have been largely ignored and as a result sectarian division has 
proliferated. Effective mechanisms for the inclusion of civil society more directly 
in addressing community division, and sufficient investment in reconstruction of 
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communities at grass-roots level are lacking in the Northern Ireland process. It 
must be acknowledged that the depth of these divisions poses a considerable 
challenge and demands imaginative and courageous intervention on the part of 
governments, politicians and civil society. To date such imagination and courage 
has largely not been manifest.  
 
6. Role of external actors 
The role of external actors was important in establishing appropriate standards of 
fairness and equity. The international community, external governments and the 
European Union all played important roles in bring fresh and relatively 
disinterested perspectives to the peace process. Local politicians became 
accustomed to being received in the White House and invited to address various 
international political arenas. This international interest helped galvanise their 
motivation for progress, and required them to give an account of themselves in 
various forums. This wider airing of the nature of the dispute and potential 
solutions ultimately helped to counteract the parochial and inward-looking 
tendencies of the local parties, who were invited to learn from other societies and 
compare their situation to that of others elsewhere.  
 
Some critics of the Agreement have focussed on its consociational nature. 
Consociational theory, first applied by Lijphart (1969) to the Northern Ireland 
case was first evident in the Sunningdale Agreement. According to the 
consociational approach, social and ethnic divisions do not inevitably entail 
political instability, and Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria at 
various stages in their history are cited as examples of consociational regimes. 
Lijphart (1996) argues that the essential conditions for the establishment of a 
consociational regime are the presence of a strong elite willing to accommodate 
one another and marshall their followers to do likewise.
21
 According to Lijphart 
                                                 
21
 Lijphart (1996) was pessimistic about the prospects for a consociational settlement because of 
the absence of support among Unionists, and because the Unionist majority was married to the 
Westminster majoritarian tradition, and aspired to the exercise of hegemonic power, rejecting 
power-sharing. 
 22 
(1969) they have four basic features, not all of which was present in the Northern 
Ireland case: a grand coalition in the executive which includes all the main sub-
cultures; proportional representation of those sub-cultures in the legislature, 
administration and public institutions; group autonomy, facilitating self-
government by each sub-culture (not present); and minority vetoes on decisions 
made about crucial issues.  
 
Consociationalism has its critics. O’Leary and McGarry (1996) argue that 
consociationalism emphasises endogenous factors in political conflict, whereas 
they argue Northern Ireland was influenced by both endogenous and exogenous 
factors.  Anderson and Goodman (1998) see the consociational model as 
seriously defective, with its assumption of the permanency of ethnic division, and 
its failure to take account of other divisions such as gender and class. In the 
same vein Wilford (1992) accused consociationalism of consolidating ethnic 
division. Similar criticisms have been voiced by Taylor (1994) and Dixon (1996), 
the former advocates economic growth and the eradication of discrimination, and 
the latter argues that integration and mass participation provide more effective 
alternative approaches to ethnic division. All of these criticisms focus, in one way 
or another, on the inability of the consociational model to overcome divisions, its 
tendency to institutionalise them, and its failure to foster cross-cutting identities.  
 
Conclusion 
One can see the Agreement as merely the potential beginning of the solution, 
not the solution itself. The Agreement was as much a product of previous failed 
attempts at peacemaking and the changed economic and political environment 
as it was a product of the negotiations at the time. Zartman (2000) argues that 
peace processes must wait for ‘ripe moments’, which are necessary but not 
sufficient for the success of such processes. ‘Ripeness’, in the case of Northern 
Ireland was not passively awaited, but constructed through the intervention over 
several decades of various actors, all of whom deliberately contributed to peace 
building. Those contributions at the time they were made may have seemed 
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unsuccessful or futile, yet they each contributed another piece of the jigsaw 
puzzle that ultimately came together on that Friday before Easter in 1998. 
Horowitz (2002) however, counsels that the conditions under which the 
Agreement was produced are unlikely to be replicable in many other contexts. 
He also points out that the fact that the institutions were agreed does not mean 
that they will deliver positive and functioning democracy in the long run, nor that 
they will positively address the divisions in Northern Ireland society that they are 
expected by some to heal.    
 
Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, the Assembly now faces the challenges of 
operationalising politics within the new structures. Following the departure of Ian 
Paisley as First Minister, and his replacement by Peter Robinson, the 
honeymoon, such as it was, between the DUP and Sinn Féin is clearly over. At 
the time of writing, the Assembly has not met for over a month. There are claims 
that Sinn Féin's attempts to secure the transfer of policing and justice powers to 
Stormont by autumn 2008, and to obtain the introduction of an Irish Language 
Act was derailing other business
22
. It remains to be seen whether the Assembly 
will survive in the long run. In the 2007 Northern Ireland Life and Times survey, 
just over half the respondents thought that Northern Ireland should continue to 
have devolved government (NILT, 2007). It remains to be seen whether and for 
how long they get their wish. Some, such as Reynolds (2000), have suggested 
that the Good Friday Agreement and the Assembly may be transitional stages on 
the route to a united Ireland, arguably rendered inevitable by demographic shifts. 
Only time will tell.  
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